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Abstractor
Alibi-Hako v. State, 175 A.2d 42 (Del. 1961).
Defendant was convicted of driving while under
the influence of liquor, driving while his license was
revoked, and possession of a revoked license. On
appeal, he contended that the trial court errone-
ously instructed that defendant bore the burden
of proving his alibi defense to the satisfaction of
the jury. The Supreme Court of Delaware affirmed
the judgment on the possession count but reversed
as to the counts involving driving, holding that the
instruction, which had the effect of placing on
defendant the burden of proving his alibi defense
by a preponderance of the evidence, was an in-
correct statement of the law, since alibi is not an
affirmative defense but rather a denial of any
connection with the crime; and consequently
defendant should have been acquitted if the proof
of alibi raised a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.
Arrest-People v. Rucker, 17 Cal. Rptr. 98
(Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of possession of heroin. On appeal, he contended
that the trial court erred in admitting evidence
seized pursuant to an illegal arrest without a
warrant. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that when police officers who were in a
hotel corridor with the consent of the manager for
the purpose of checking lights and fire escapes
overheard a conversation, emanating from a room
known by them to be rented by an addict, re-
garding the intravenous taking of narcotics and
the penetration of a needle, they had probable
cause to believe that the occupants of the room
were engaged in the commission of a felony, and
thus the officers validly arrested defendant who
*was then in the room; and the fact that probable
cause arose from information obtained by eaves-
dropping did not render the arrest invalid as the
result of an unlawful search, since eavesdropping
in lack of trespass does not constitute a search.
Arrest-Uniform Arrest Act-K avanagh v.
Stenhouse, 174 A.2d 560 (R.I. 1961). In a civil
* Student, Northwesterfi University School of Law.
action against a police officer for false arrest, the
jury returned a verdict for defendant. Excepting
to certain portions of the charge and to the trial
court's denial of his request for certain instructions
and of his motion for directed verdict, plaintiff
contended that the temporary detention statute,
[R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §12-7-1 (1956) ], pleaded
by defendant as justification for having detained
plaintiff, is unconstitutional as a violation of due
process, since it is an invalid attempt to distinguish
between "arrest" and "detention" and it allows
detention upon mere suspicion. The Supreme
Court of Rhode Island overruled plaintiff's excep-
tions and ordered that judgment be entered on
the verdict, holding that since the two-hour
detention permitted by the statute is reasonably
limited in time, is free from unreasonable restraint,
and is based upon circumstances reasonably
suggestive of criminal involvement, the legislature
in the exercise of its police power constitutionally
provided a distinction between arrest and deten-
tion though none existed at common law, and
that the words "reason to suspect" establish a
just standard for detention as distinguished from
arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-Busby v. United
States, 296 F.2d 328 (9th Cir. 1961). Defendants
were convicted of possession of unregistered
firearms. On appeal, they contended that the
district court erred in admitting as evidence a
sawed-off shotgun which had been obtained as a
result of an illegal search and seizure. The Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding
that although the arresting officers lacked probable
cause to arrest defendants or search their car
prior to discovery of the shotgun, there was no
arrest under applicable law [which requires "taking
a person into custody," CAL. PEN. CODE §834]
when defendants were asked to step out of their
car; that once defendants left the car and the
officers saw the shotgun, they thereby acquired
the requisite probable cause to arrest without
a warrant; and consequfently the evidence was
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
admissible whether the search pursuant to the
valid arrest preceded or followed such arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Torres,
17 Cal. Rptr. 495 (1961). Defendant was convicted
of possessing narcotics. On appeal, he contended
that illegally obtained evidence was used against
him. The Supreme Court of California affirmed,
holding that where the arresting officer observed
defendant in an area known to be frequented by
narcotics users and sellers, saw two men whom
defendant drove to a drugstore purchase milk sugar
and gelatin capsules, and saw a known addict leave
defendant's apartment, it was reasonable for the
officer and his partners to believe that defendant
was involved with narcotics, and proper for them
to seek to interview him at his home; that when
upon entering defendant's apartment the officers
saw a woman running toward the bathroom, they
had reasonable cause to believe that she was
attempting to dispose of narcotics; and since at
that point the officers had probable cause to arrest
defendant, the narcotics seized in a search inci-
dental to defendant's arrest were properly ad-
mitted even though the search preceded the arrest.
Arrest, Search and Seizure-People v. Ruiz, 16
Cal. Rptr. 855 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant
was convicted of possession of heroin. On appeal,
he contended that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence obtained during
an unlawful search pursuant to an arrest without
a warrant which was illegal for want of probable
cause and for lack of compliance with CAL. PEN.
CoDE §844. The District Court of Appeal affirmed,
holding that where information from an anony-
mous informer was coupled with the facts that
defendant's companion, one Bruner, attempted to
slam the door on an arresting officer known by
Bruner to be a police officer, and that needle
marks on Bruner's arm were then visible to the
officer, there was probable cause to arrest Bruner;
that when defendant dashed to the bathroom
upon the officers' forcible entry, they had probable
cause to believe that he was about to attempt
to dispose of heroin and could thereupon legally
arrest him without a warrant; that the officers
were excused from compliance with §844, re-
quiring that a peace officer demand and be refused
admission before he may lawfully make a forcible
entry, since they believed both reasonably and
in good faith that compliance . would frustrate
the arrest and permit the destruction of evidence;
and consequently evidence seized during a reason-
able search pursuant to defendant's arrest was
properly admitted at his trial.
Concurrent State and Municipal Jurisdiction-
City of St. Paul v. Ulmer, 111 N.W.2d 612 (Minn.
1961). Defendant was convicted of driving while
intoxicated in violation of a St. Paul city ordinance.
On appeal from the judgment and from the munici-
pal court's denial of his motion to dismiss, de-
fendant contended that since he did not waive
a jury trial, the municipal court should have
impanelled a jury as in any criminal case. The
Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed, holding
that a state statute [1Mnn. STAT. §169.03 (1957) ],
which permits local authorities to adopt traffic
regulations covering any subject for which a
penalty is provided by state law so long as the
local penalty is identical to the state penalty for
the same offense, requires by implication that
procedures governing enforcement of such a local
law be identical to state criminal procedures used
in enforcing the state law covering the same
offense; and since defendant was charged with
violating a municipal traffic ordinance the viola-
tion of which constitutes a violation of a state
criminal law, the municipal court's failure to
provide a jury was reversible error where defendant
had not waived his right to trial by jury.
Confessions-Harling v. United States, 295
F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Defendant was con-
victed of assault with a dangerous weapon and of
robbery. On appeal, defendant contended that the
district court erroneously admitted testimony of
damaging statements which he made while in
police custody and while under jurisdiction of the
Juvenile Court. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit reversed and re-
manded, holding that in order to preserve the
non-criminal philosophy upon which the Juvenile
Court is based and to maintain the Court's parens
patriae relation to juvenile offenders, juvenile
proceedings must be insulated from adult proceed-
ings; and consequently that admissions made by
defendant in connection with juvenile proceedings
at a time before the Juvenile Court had waived
its original and exclusive jurisdiction* should not
have been used against him in adult criminal
proceedings.
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Confessions-United States v. Ladson, 294
F.2d 535'(2d Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of selling or facilitating the sale of heroin and of
conspiracy. On appeal, he contended that the
confession which he made to an Assistant United
States Attorney after arrest and before arraign-
ment was erroneously used against him at the
trial in violation of the McNabb-Mallory rule.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed, holding that, notwithstanding the avail-
ablity of a United States Commissioner, a de-
lay of defendant's arraignment hearing for one
hour for the purpose of questioning him and reduc-
ing his prior oral admissions to writing in order to
aid the Assistant United States Attorney, whose
duty it was to determine what charges should be
made, was not an "unnecessary delay" within
Federal Rule 5(a); and hence defendant's state-
ment was properly admitted at the trial.
Confessions-United States v. Meachum, 197
F. Supp. 803 (D.D.C. 1961). Defendant was
arrested for robbery. His pre-trial motion to
suppress was based on the contention that a
confession which the government planned to
introduce at his pending trial had been illegally
obtained. Citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
abstracted at 52 J. CaR. L., C. & P.S. 292 (1961),
the District Court suppressed the confession,
lblding that since there was no probable cause to
arrest and detain defendant after the robbery
victim failed to identify him in a "line-up," de-
fendant's Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when7 he was not then released; and evidence
consisting of his confession, which was procured
as a result of such violation, must be suppressed.
Tlie court noted that defendant's confession was
inadmissible for the additional reason that it
fiad been obtained in violation of Federal Rule
5(a).
Confessions-People v...Brown, 17 Cal. Rptr.
884 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was con-
victed of assault, rape, perversion, and robbery.
On appeal, defendant contendedcthat his convic-
tion was based on his coerced damaging admission
to a polygraph kerator. Noting that the case was
one of first impression in California, the District
Court of Appeal reversed, holding that defendant's
admission was coerced inasmuch as it was made
in reliance upon a promise by the polygraph
operator, one Harmon, that if defendant confessed,
he would not be charged; and that although
Harmon was not a law enforcement officer, the
admission should have been excluded since de-
fendant reasonably believed that Harrnon had
been designated by the prosecuting officers as
one whose promises would probably be fulfilled.
Confessions-People v. Bodkin, 16 Cal. Rptr.
506 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was con-
victed of selling marijuana to a minor. On appeal
from the judgment and from an order denying
his motion for new trial, defendant contended
that the trial court should not have admitted the
tape recording of his confession, since the confes-
sion was made before he was informed of his right
to counsel and was recorded without his knowledge.
The District Court of Appeal affirmed, holding
that recording defendant's confession without his
knowledge did not constitute an invasion of his
rights since there was no physical invasion of a
constitutionally protected place; and that neither
recordation nor failure to advise defendant of his
right to counsel rendered his confession in-
admissible.
Confessions--Campbell v. State, 122 S.E.2d
533 (Ga. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
voluntary manslaughter. Excepting to the trial
court's overruling of his motion for new trial,
defendant contended that since no statement
-made by him constituted a confession, the trial
court should not have charged on the law of
confessions. The Court of Appeals of Georgia
reversed e A remanded, holding that since a jury
could acquit defendant even if .it believed all
statements made by him which were in evidence,
the statements were not confessions; and that
when the trial court charged on the law of con-
fessions it committed reversible error where there
was no evidence of a confession by defendant.
Confessions-People v. Jackson, 178 N.E.2d
299 (Ill. 1961). Defendant was convicted of armed
robbery. On writ of error, defendant contended
that the trial court should not have admitted his
voluntary confession on the ground that it was
made while he was being -detained in violation of
ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 38, §660 (1957), which is
identical to FED. R. C=. P. 5(a). The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that where the
five hours which intervened between the time
police obtained information sufficient to support
[Vol. 53
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formal charges against defendant and the time he
signed the confession was taken up with the
examination of defendant and the three men
arrested with him, the next day was a legal holiday,
and defendant was taken before a magistrate the
following day, there was no unreasonable delay,
inasmuch as the statute cannot be construed so
strictly as to require police officers to forsake
essential and reasonable investigatory duties. The
court indicated that the same result would have
been reached even if the detention had been
illegal, since Illinois should not adopt an evi-
dentiary rule comparable to the federal McNabb-
Mallory rule.
Confessions-State v. Young, 351 S.W.2d 732
(Mo. 1961). Defendant was convicted on three
counts of forcible rape and of burglary in the
first degree. On appeal from the trial court's
order overruling his motion to vacate, defendant
contended that since his coerced admissions of
guilt were heard by the grand jury which indicted
him, the judgment entered pursuant to the indict-
ment was void. The Supreme Court of Missouri
affirmed, holding that the judgment and sentence
imposed on defendant's admittedly voluntary
plea of guilty to the indictment was not void or
subject to collateral attack, since the admissions
were not used against defendant at the trial and
the grand jpry's indictment could be supported
by other evidence.
Confessions-United States v. Vita, 294 F.2d
524 (2d Cir. 1961). Defendants were convicted
of bank robbery, putting lives in jeopardy by use
of a dangerous weapon while committing robbery,
and conspiracy. On appeal, defendant Vita con-
tended that the district court erred in denying
his motion to exclude damaging admissions and
confessions on the ground that they were uttered
while he was being held in custody in violation of
Federal Rule 5(a). The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit affirmed, holding that if Vita had
willingly accompanied FBI agents to headquarters
at 10 a.m. and had voluntarily remained there and
submitted to questioning, he was under detention
at no time prior to his arrest at 6:52 p.m.; that if,
contrary to the district court's finding of fact,
Vita was detained against his will, detention for
questioning until about 4:45 p.m., at which time
the agents had obtained enough evidence to justify
his arrest, was not equivalent to arrest, and
consequently Federal Rule 5(a), which deals with
detention subsequent to arrest, did not apply;
and even if detention of Vita after4:45 p.m. was
tantamount to arrest betause the FBI agents
could then, have arrested him, their failure to take
him before a committing magistrate until the next
morning did not render his statements inadmis-
sible, inasmuch as the detention, which was for
purposes of essential investigation rather than
as an excuse for delay during which a confession
could be extracted, was not an "unnecessary
delay" in violation of Federal Rule 5(a).
Discovery-Jones v. Superior Court, 17 Cal.
Rptr. 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Self-In-
crimination, infra.
Double Jeopardy-Commonwealth v. Colonial
Stores, Inc., 350 S.W.2d 465 (Ky. 1961). After
defendant was convicted on one of 416 separate
indictments, each charging a violation of a statute
proscribing the sale or offering for sale of a quantity
of any commodity less than the quantity repre-
sented, the Commonwealth sought a trial on the
other indictments, but the trial court dismissed
the indictments, sustaining defendant's plea of
former jeopardy. The Commonwealth requested
a 'certification of the law, the question being
whether under the statute, Ky. REv. STAT. §363.
280 (4) (Supp. 1956), the offering for sale at one
time of 416 separately wrapped packages of
meat, each package weighing less than the weight
stamped thereon, constituted one offense or 416
offenses. The Court of Appeals of Kentucky certi-
fied that such action constituted only one offense,
holding that in case of ambiguity a penal statute
should be construed so as to avoid turning a single
transaction into multiple offenses, especially in a
case such as this, where the opposite construction
would result in a punishment totally dispropor-
tionate to the gravity of the offense [i.e., a fine of
$10,400 to $41,600 and imprisonment of 11 to
68 years]; and hence at the offering stage the goods
constituted only one commodity under the statute
although offered in separate packages. The Court
noted that at the selling stage a separate offense
would be committed as to goods passed to one
purchaser in one sale regardless of the number of
packages involved.
False Pretenses-Stokes v. State, 366 P.2d 425
(Okla. Crim. App. 1961). Defendant was con-
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victed of obtaining services by false pretenses.
On appeal, he contended that telephone service
was not a "valuable thing" within the meaning of
the statute [Okla. STAT. tit. 21, §1541 (1951) ],
and that the judgment and sentence were exces-
sive. The Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma
affirmed as modified, holding that although
telephone service is intangible and non-corporeal,
it is a "valuable thing" since it is bought and sold
as a commodity at legally established rates, and
consequently defendant violated the statute when
he was permitted to make a long distance telephone
call by fraudulently representing that he was
authorized to use a credit card of the telephone
company; and though the sentence of six months
in jail and fine of $250 were not excessive under
the statute, the judgment should be modified to 30
days in jail and a fine of $100 in the interest of
justice; since the cost of the telephone call was
67 .
Grand juries-State v. Young, 351 S.W.2d
732 (Mo. 1961). See Confessions, supra.
Hypnotism-Evidence Based Upon-People v.
Busch, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961). Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder, two counts of
second degree murder, and assault with intent to
commit murder. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in sustaining the prosecu-
tion's objection to the proferred testimony of one
Bryan, a physician, regarding defendant's sanity
and ability to premeditate and deliberate at the
time the alleged crimes were committed. The
excluded opinions were formed as a result of Dr.
Bryan's hypnosis of the defendant. The Supreme
Court of California affirmed, holding that the
trial court properly sustained the objection, since
hypnotism has not yet been recognized by any
court as being sufficiently reliable as a basis for
such opinions, and defendant failed to lay a proper
foundation for the introduction of Dr. Bryan's
testimony by showing the successful use of hyp-
nosis for similar purposes in other instances.
Illegal Detention-Payne v. United States, 294
F.2d 723 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Defendant was con-
victed of grand larceny. On appeal, he contended
that evidence resulting from his illegal arrest and
detention should not have been admitted at the
trial. The Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit affirmed, holding that although
defendant was illegally detained after being legally
arrested on probable cause without a warrant, the
trial curt properly allowed the victim of the
robbery to identify defendant at the trial, notwith-
standing the fact that the victim had originally
identified him during the period of illegal detention,
since suppression of testimony of a complaining
witness in such a case is not necessary either to
control police conduct or to protect a defendant's
rights. Noting that no evidence obtained by
interrogation of defendant during detention was
used at his trial, the court distinguished such
evidence from that resulting from the confronta-
tion involved in the instant case, reasoning that
because it is 'a precaution against unfounded
charges, confrontation is likely to be more bene-
ficial than harmful to an accused, even if it occurs
during a period of illegal detention.
Improper Remarks by Prosecutor-People v.
Love, 16 Cal. Rptr. 777 (1961). Defendant was
convicted of first degree murder, and the jury
fixed the penalty at death. On appeal from the
judgment and from the order denying his motion
for new trial, defendant contended that the
prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct by
discussing the deterrent effect of the death penalty
in his summation. The Supreme Court of California
reversed and remanded as to the question of
penalty, holding that when the prosecutor stated
as a matter of fact the disputed proposition that
capital punishment is a more effective deterrent
of crime than is imprisonment, his statement was
prejudicial since it tended to affect the jury's
attitude in fixing the penalty; and since the error
was of such character that it could not have been
cured by prompt admonition and cautionary
instructions, defendant was entitled to a redeter-
mination of penalty even though he had failed to
object to the statement at the trial.
Improper Remarks by Prosecutor-State v.
Davis, 122 S.E.2d 633 (S.C. 1961). Defendant, a
white man, was convicted of having raped a negro
woman. On appeal, defendant contended that his
trial was unfair because the prosecutor stated in
his dosing argument: "[fIl you turn this man loose
I'm going to turn the others loose," since the jury
knew that one of the "others" referred to was one
Sharpe, a negro, soon to be tried for assault with
intent to ravish a white woman. See Taking
Photographs in Court-State v. Sharpe, 122 S.E.2d
[Vol. 53
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622 (S.C. 1961), infra. The Supreme Court of
South Carolina reversed and remanded, holding
that in light of the great amount of local publicity
concerning defendant's and Sharpe's trials, the
statement complained of, which obviously was a
threat of a nolle prosequi in the Siarpe case, may
well have had the effect of compelling defendant's
conviction; and since the court doubted that the
statement's evil influence upon the jury was
dispelled by a cautionary instruction that no
other case had anything to do with defendant's
case, his conviction must be reversed.
Insanity-United States v. McNeill, 294 F.2d
117 (2d Cir. 1961). Petitioner, who had served a
New York state robbery sentence from 1934 to
1938, was transferred to Matteawan State Hos-
pital, an institution for the criminally insane, after
having been civilly committed in 1949 to Pilgrim
State Hospital, an institution for the mentally
ill. On appeal from the district court's denial of
his petition for writ of habeas corpus, petitioner
contended that by detaining him in Matteawan,
the State of New York was depriving him of his
Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process of
law and to equal protection of the laws. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed, granted
the writ, and directed that petitioner be returned
to Pilgrim State Hospital, holding that the New
York statute [N.Y. Comc. LAW §412], which
included a provision that an inmate of a state
mental hospital who has previously been convicted
of a crime may, without a hearing and upon ex
parte determination that he still manifests criminal
tendencies, be transferred to Matteawan State
Hospital, was unconstitutional as applied to
petitioner, since in operating to deny a judicial
transfer procedure to persons who have been
civilly committed after fully serving criminal
sentences, the statute arbitrarily discriminates
against this class of patients.
Insanity-Gans v. State, 134 So.2d 257 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of first degree murder. On appeal, defendant
contended that it was prejudicial error for the trial
court to read to the jury its order finding him
sane and able to stand trial. The District Court of
Appeal reversed and remanded, holding that the
reading of the valid order indicated to the jury
that the trial court was of the opinion that de-
fendant was not insane, and its effect was to
adjudicate summarily the issue of defendant's
sanity at the time the alleged crime was com-
mitted, which was the only real issue in the case;
and since it was impossible to determine whether
the jury construed the order as unrelated to the
question of whether defendant was sane at the
time of the crime, reading the order constituted
reversible error which could not be corrected
even by the subsequent clarifying statements
made by the trial court.
Juries-Hoyt v. Florida, 82 Sup. Ct. 159 (1961).
Defendant was convicted of second degree murder.
On appeal from the Florida Supreme Court's
affirmance of her conviction, defendant contended
that she had been convicted in violation of her
Fourteenth Amendment rights by an all-male jury
selected under a state statute [FiA. STAT. §40.01
(1) (1959) ] which operates to exclude women from
jury service. Speaking through Mr. Justice Harlan,
the United States Supreme Court affirmed, holding
that because of women's family responsibilities,
classification for jury duty purposes by sex is not
unreasonable, and hence the statute, which auto
matically exempted women from jury duty but
permitted them to serve if they chose to register
was not invalid on its face; and in the absence of
evidence showing that Florida arbitrarily excluded
women from jury service, the statute was not
unconstitutional as applied to defendant, since
in the administration of jury laws proportional
.class representation is not a constitutionally
required factor.
Juries-State v. Dodge, 365 P.2d 798 (Utah
1961). Defendants were convicted of second degree
burglary. On appeal, they contended that they
were deprived of their constitutional right to due
process of law because the trial court gave intel-
ligence tests to prospective jurors and restricted
the panel to those who achieved a certain mini-
mum grade. The Supreme Court of Utah affirmed,
holding that although the restriction of the panel
in this manner was error, since it could tend to
deny a defendant his constitutional right to be
tried by a fair and impartial jury procured from a
cross-section of the community, defendants failed
to show that they were in fact prejudiced thereby.
Juvenile Proceedings-Harlizg v. Utnited States,
295 F.2d 161 (D.C. Cir. 1961). See Confessions,
supra.
19621
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Right to Counsel-People o. Bodkin, 16 Cal.
Rptr. 506 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Confessions,
supra.
Robbery-Carey v. United States, 296 F.2d
422 (D.C. Cir. 1961). Defendant was convicted of
manslaughter and robbery. On appeal, he con-
tended that as a matter of law he could not be
guilty of robbery, since the victim was already
dead when defendant took money from her body.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit affirmed, holding that since the applicable
statute [D.C. CoDE ANN. §22-2901 (1951) ] ex-
pands the common-law crime of robbery, the
victim was a "person" under the statute even if
she was dead at the time defendant took her
money, in light of the shortness of time between
stabbing and robbery, and especially since de-
fendant did not know she was then dead.
Search and Seizure-Vasquez v. Superior Court,
18 Cal. Rptr. 140 (Dist. Ct. App. 1962). Petitioner
was being tried on two counts of possession of
heroin. On petition for writ of prohibition to
restrain the Superior Court from continuing with
the trial, he contended that evidence in support
of each count was obtained as the result of an
illegal search and seizure. The District Court of
Appeal granted the writ, holding that when
police forcibly administered apomorphine to
petitioner, causing him to vomit, after they saw
him swallow a condom of what they believed to be
and which later proved to be heroin, their conduct
constituted a search and seizure which was brutal,
shocking to the conscience, and in violation of
petitioner's constitutional rights; that the search
without a warrant of petitioner's apartment
several miles from where he was arrested was not
incidental to arrest and consequently illegal; and
that since evidence essential to support each count
was procured by means of these illegal searches,
-the requested writ must be granted.
Search and Seizure-People v. Kelley, 177
N.E.2d 830 (Ill. 1961). Defendant was convicted
of armed robbery. On appeal, he contended that
the trial court erred in failing to suppress evidence
obtained through an unlawful search. The Supreme
Court of Illinois affirmed, holding that where
defendant denied P~ossession of a watch and wallet
which were found in an alley some 40 feet distant
from the point at which defendant was arrested,
he lacked standing to question the legality of the
search. Noting that this is a settled principle of
law in Illinois, the court distinguished the present
case from the exception to that rule, wherein a
defendant who is charged with possession of
articles taken in a search need not allege possession
in order to object to the search.
Search and Seizure-State v. Valentin, 174
A.2d 737 (N.J. 1961). Defendant was indicted for
carrying a shotgun concealed in his automobile
without a permit. On leave to appeal from the
Appellate Division's affirmance of the trial court's
denial of his pre-trial motion to suppress, defendant
contended that" the shotgun was taken from his
car in an unreasonable search and seizure. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey remanded for
reconsideration of the motion, holding that where
the prosecution, in reliance upon the then existing
law of New Jersey, a non-exclusionary rule state,
had not submitted evidence as to the circumstances
surrounding the search and seizure, and Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, abstracted at 52 J. Cnim. L.,
C. & P.S. 292 (1961), which renders inadmissible
in a state criminal prosecution evidence obtained
by unreasonable search and seizure, was decided
after denial of defendant's motion to suppress but
before argument of the present appeal, the matter
must be remanded to the trial court to permit
both parties to introduce all proof relevant to the
new issue generated by Mapp.
Search and Seizure-People v. Morgan, 16
Cal. Rptr. 838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). See Wire-
tapping, infra.
Self-Incrimination-Jones v. Superior Court, 17
Cal. Rptr. 575 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). After
petitioner was granted a continuance of his trial
for rape on the basis of an affidavit alleging that
he needed additional time to obtain medical proof
of his inability to obtain a penile erection, the trial
court granted the prosecution's motion for an
order requiring petitioner or his attorney to
produce medical records and names of physicians.
On petition for writ of prohibition to restrain
enforcement of the order, petitioner contended
that such discovery would constitute a violation
of his privilege against self-incrimination. The
District Court of Appeal issued the writ, holding
that the privilege is not limited to testimonial
compulsion, and consequently since petitoner
[Vol. 53
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denied physical capacity to commit the alleged
crime, he could not constitutionally be required to
produce the material covered by the order.
Shoplifting-State v. Hales, 122 S.E.2d 768
(N.C. 1961). After she was convicted of shop-
lifting, defendant appealed to the Superior Court,
which granted her motion to quash on the ground
that the statute [N.C. GEN. STAT. §14-72.1 (1957)]
was unconstitutional in that it required no felo-
nious intent, i.e., intent to deprive the owner
permanently of his property. On appeal, the State
contended that the legislature could constitu-
tionally pass such a statute in the exercise of its
police power. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed, holding that the statute, which
provided that one who without authority wilfully
conceals the goods or merchandise of any store,
not theretofore purchased by the person, while on
the premises of the store, shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, violated neither state nor federal due
process, since the prohibited act was reasonably
related to the protection of merchants from shop-
lifting, the end sought to be accomplished.
Speedy Trial-People v. Bryarly, 178 N.E.2d 326
(Ill. 1961). Defendant was convicted of assault
with intent to kill. On writ of error, defendant
contended that in failing to issue a warrant for
his arrest until four and one-half years after it
could have done so, the State of Illinois deprived
him of his constitutional right to a speedy trial
[ILL. CONST. art. II, §9]. The Supreme Court of
Illinois reversed, holding that although defendant
had wrongfully left the jurisdiction when pro-
ceedings were pending against him, the State
denied him a speedy trial by not issuing a warrant
for his arrest until four and one-half years after it
first learned of his incarceration in Ohio, since
Illinois' knowledge of defendant's incarceration
placed upon it the burden of promptly initiating
extradition proceedings to return the defendant to
Illinois for trial.
Suicide-State v. Willis, 121 S.E.2d 854 (N.C.
1961). Defendant's motion to quash the bill of
indictment charging that he "unlawfully and
feloniously did attempt to commit suicide" was
granted on the grbund that the bill failed to state
a crime. On appeal, the State contended that since
suicide is a crime in North Carolina, an attempt to
commit suicide constitutes the indictable offense of
criminal attempt. The Supreme Court of North
Carolina reversed, holding that inasmuch as suicide
was felonious homicide at common law, it is also a
crime in North Carolina under a statute [N.C.
GEN. STAT. §4-1 (1957)] which adopts the common
law; that the criminal character of the act is not
abrogated by the fact that a successful perpetrator
of suicide cannot be punished; and consequently
the trial court should not have quashed the
indictment, since an attempt to commit a crime
is an indictable offense. As further justification for
its decision, the court noted that accessories before
and after the fact to suicide cannot be punished
as criminal offenders in jurisdictions which do not
deem suicide to be a crime.
Taking Photographs in Court-State v. Sharpe,
122 S.E.2d 622 (S.C. 1961). Defendant, a Negro,
was convicted of having assaulted a white woman
with intent to ravish her, and was sentenced to
death. On appeal, defendant contended that the
trial court erred in permitting photographers and
newsreel men to take pictures in the courtroom
during his trial.,The Supreme Court of South
Carolina reversed and remanded, holding that
allowing photographs to be taken at the trial
constituted reversible error, since such practices
tend to undermine the decorum and dignity of the
judicial process essential to the preservation of a
defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial. The
court also held that Canon 35 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics should be enforced in all trials in
South Carolina.
Wiretapping-Carnes v. United States, 295
F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1961). Defendants were con-
victed of violating Internal Revenue Liquor Laws.
On appeal, they contended that their convictions
were based upon evidence which, having been
obtained in violation of section 605 of the Federal
Communications Act of 1934, should not have been
admitted at the trial. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit affirmed, holding that when a federal
agent recorded and listened to telephone con-
versations with the consent of one party but
without the knowledge or consent of the other, he
committed no violation of section 605, and conse-
quently evidence so obtained was properly ad-
mitted at the trial.
Wiretapping-People v. Morgan, 16 Cal. Rptr.
838 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961). Defendant was con-
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victed of second degree robbery. On appeal, he
contended that a -recording of his damaging
admissions should not have been introduced as
evidence on the ground that the recordation was
unlawful as a violation of his Fourth Amendment
rights, of section 605 of the Federal Communica-
tions Act of 1934, and of his right to privacy. The
Disirict Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that
since the admissions were made during a con-
versation on a telephone which was part of the
County Jail's independent and private inter-
communication system, recordation did not
constitute either an illegal search and seizure,
inasmuch as no physical trespass was involved, or
a violation of §605, because the Act was not
intended to apply to so private a telephone system;
and since lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct of
imprisonment, defendant could not complain that
his privacy had been invaded.
Wiretapping-Commonwealth v. Dougherty, 178
N.E.2d 584 (Mass. 1961). Defendants were con-
victed of murder in the second degree and of
conspiracy. On appeal, they contended that their
incriminating conversation should not have been
used as evidence at the trial, since it had been
recorded by police officers in violation of a state
statute and of the Fourth Amendment. The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts affirmed,
holding that since defendants were in police
station cells when their conversation was recorded,
the police officers did not violate either the statute
[MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 272, §99 (1959)],
inasmuch as the exclusive control of the premises
by the police department caused the statutory
exception [Id., §101] to apply, or the Fourth
Amendment, since the officers did not physically
invade a constitutionally protected place.
Wiretapping-Cameron v. State, 365 P.2d 576
.(Okla. Crim. App. 1961). Defendant was con-
victed of perjury. On appeal, defendant contended
that since recordation and disclosure of his in-
criminating telephone conversation violated
Oklahoma law [OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §§1757, 1782
(1951)], a tape recording of the conversation should
not have been admitted as evidence. The Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed, allowing the State to
retry defendant if it could obtain admissible
evidence to support the charges against him,
holding that since the purposes of the statute are
to protect telephone company facilities against
trespassers and users of telephone service against
invasion of privacy by eavesdroppers, the federal
agent who recorded defendant's conversation by
placing recording equipment on the extension
phone of one Walker, a party to the conversation,
violated the statute even though Walker consented
to the interception; that the evidence so obtained
was inadmissibl6; and consequently defendant's
conviction must be reversed, since without the
inadmissible recording the remaining evidence was
insufficient.
Withholding Evidence-Brady v. State, 174
A.2d 167 (Md. 1961). Defendant was sentenced to
death on a conviction of first degree murder. On
appeal from denial of his application for post
conviction relief, defendant contended that at the.
time of his trial, the police knew that his accom-
plice, one Boblit, had confessed to the actual
killing, and that the state's failure to inform
defendant of the existence of this confession con-
stituted a violation of due process. The Court of
Appeals of Maryland reversed and remanded for a
new trial on the question of punishment only,
holding that the State was under a duty to produce
the confession or at least to inform defendant of its
existence, since it had knowledge that defendant
chiefly relied upon the hope that he might not
receive capital punishment if the jury believed his
testimony that Boblit did the actual killing; that
the State's withholding of material evidence
tending to exculpate defendant constituted a
violation of due process even though it was not
the result of guile; and since defendant was prej-
udiced by the unconstitutional withholding to the
extent of the significance the jury might have
attached to Boblit's undisclosed confession in its
determination of punishment, a new trial must be
held on that issue.
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